More coalition soldiers have died in July than in any previous month in the nine-year war in Afghanistan. Last week, the soldier who slept on the cot next to me was killed. A rocket-propelled grenade fired from a snow-capped mountain in remote Nuristan Province killed Staff Sgt. Eric Lindstrom, a father of twin baby girls and the best squad leader in the platoon. Strangely, our military leaders rarely talk about the battles here. They urge shooting less and drinking more cups of tea with village elders. This is the new face of war—counterinsurgency defined as nation-building, an idealistic blend of development aid and John Locke philosophy. Our generals say that the war is “80% non-kinetic.”
Although they welcome the largess provided by coalition forces, the village elders with whom our soldiers drink tea are intimidated by an enemy that prowls at night when our forces return to their bases. The Taliban is a highly mobile, amorphous force, with little popular support. But it is very willing to fight. Firefights are infrequent during the harvest seasons for poppy, corn and wheat, indicating that most local guerrillas are poor kids raised in a culture of tribal feuds, brigandage and AK rifles. The enemy leaders, more sinister and gangster-like, slip back and forth across the 1,500-mile border with Pakistan.
While our Special Operations Forces launch raids that disrupt the Taliban, our conventional soldiers carry out the less-adventurous “framework” operations—mainly presence patrols. With 80 pounds on their back, day after day they slog through the heat, dust and mud, waiting for the enemy to initiate contact. continues
additional quotes:
"instead of 60,000 American soldiers we actually need 100,000—and many more helicopters."
"War is not complicated. You have to separate the guerrilla forces from the population and kill them until they no longer want to continue."
"Overall, too few of the enemy are being killed or captured to sap their morale. It’s like fighting Apaches in the 19th century."
There are a couple of points I might question but overall the article covers the major issues facing ISAF. The war is winnable, it is mostly a matter of political will, something the British government appears to be lacking along with the capacity to finance the campaign properly. I therefore hope for the sake of the Afghan people that the Americans ignore the British government's attempts to talk to the Taliban, and given the failure of the British strategy in Basra (Iraq) and the American's successs with their surge, they probably will.
9 comments:
Bravo. A timely corrective to the corrosive cynicism on display in much of the British press
A spirited defense of a vital mission, and the perfect antidote to the constant drumbeat of cynicism and despair from papers like The Guardian
This article deserves to be widely read, not least by those determined naysayers on the Op-Ed pages, for whom the whole thing was a grisly error from the start and for whom it remains the most monstrous and murderous extravagance.
An important article and an excellent post. Well done. I aim to bring this article to the attention of as many people as possible today.
Thanks Scott and I would just like to make it clear, I'm not gung ho for more action, I would just like to see the whole bloody mess resolved as quickly as possible with the least possible bloodshed and that means overwhelming force.
After that there's the question of winning the peace but God knows whether that's possible.
Of course the British army have been embarrassed by recent events in Basra but the main fault lies with our politicians who are completely disinterested in military matters and incompetent to boot.
Let's not forget, it was the British army who taught the Americans the "hearts an minds" attitude. When the Americans arrived in Iraq they had no experience of this type of soldiering. Now all the work by the British has paid off and the Americans are applying this with success. Well done.
I'm sorry but it's not winnable.
We were humiliated in Iraq and we will be humiliated in Afghanistan.
Hundreds of thousands of Russians couldn't win and neither can the allies.
Afghanistan is a magnet for jihadis who yearn to die as martyrs (although the thought of the 72 virgins is less desirable now that they've seen Susan Boyle ).
We could stay there a thousand years and even hold the ground but the day we leave it would be back to business as usual.
All the money and lives wasted is a tragedy.
Wasted Lives,
The old Mujaheddin were financed and supplied by the Americans, the present Taliban have no comparable backers.
You are right about the British in Iraq and it's been pretty much as I thought for the British in Afghanistan. However, the recent American success in Iraq will give the American political class the belief that the same will be achieved in Afghanistan, and it can.
The problem is not the war but as you allude to, the peace.
Please don't think I am denigrating the British army, from what I have seen they are light years ahead of what they were, I only have the greatest admiration for them, though Still lions led by donkeys.
Swiss Bob
The Taliban have significant backers. Iran with it's IED expertise and ammunition supplies. Pakistan with it's recruitment drives and R&R / Training facilities. Plus of course it's got the internet now which calls for money and support from the rest of the world. And of course the loose links with Al Qaeda.
What has been achieved in Iraq ?
A corrupt government. Widespread destruction of the country. Inter religious never ending warfare. A new breeding ground for terrorists. A godsend to Iran which will now be dominant in the region. Daily bombings, murders and kidnappings. Lack of power and water supplies etc...
Afghanistan will now be the same unfortunately. You can't foist democracy onto countries who don't want it. Or invade countries because you don't like their leaders.
Mr WL,
The Taliban have backers, none of the present bunch are as significant as the CIA was to the Taliban in the 1980's, and the reason why is: The present day Taliban have no capacity to destroy either armoured vehicles or aircraft unlike the Taliban in the time of the Soviet occuaption. Russian casualties ran at the rate of 1,537 per year (Wiki), they do not have the capacity to inflict serious losses on the ISAF forces although it has been a 'close run' thing on occasion.
Pakistan is of course a problem.
Concerning Iraq, the general concensus has been that the surge was a success and that Iraq is slowly returning to normalty, this may be incorrect, we'll see. I wouldn't pretend to justify what happened there, I would be happy to see any solution that worked given we can't undo what's been done.
With regards to corrupt administrations there has been a recent review by the US DoD that specifically addresses this point, again we'll see.
I believe that the Afghan perople will be better off if ISAF do a good job of eradicating the Taliban militarily and politically , secure Afghanistan's borders and ensure a decent civil government. The present alternative is to leave and ensure a disaster.
The Editor
There was a good report in The Times today. It said 75% of ISAF casualties are caused by IED's. That's over a hundred UK deaths and hundreds of injuries. There was also a good report from a reporter embedded with the US Marines. They were patrolling a 'cleared area' and it was just as deadly as any other area. This highlights the problem of fighting the Taliban. They can go from farmer to fighter and back to farmer just by swapping from shovel to rifle in a few seconds.
Corruption in Iraq goes right to the heart of the government with reports that the British hostages reported murdered this week were killed on the orders of the government as they were installing a new IT system which would monitor the aid programme and follow the money trails to ensure it wasn't being siphoned off.
Securing Afghanistans borders is nigh on impossible. Thousands of miles of rugged terrain. Panthers Claw 'cleared ' an area 10 miles by 8 miles and cost about 20 UK casualties. What chance of protecting the border ?
Mr wl,
I'm familiar with the IED numbers having entered every 2009 British casualty into a spreadsheet last month: Situation Report 2009. I hope to post on this in more detail, an interview of sorts with someone who was in Afghanistan earlier this year and is an expert in this field.
Someone elsewhere made the point about the size of Helmand Province in relation to the operational area of Panther's Claw. See the following link: 'Afghanistan' for all related posts, including maps covering the British area of operations, bases etc. You should also look at the area with Google Earth, the Helmand river valley is the only bit worth occupying (the green bit), the British in Central Helmand and the Americans occupying the south. I am not of course saying that more troops aren't needed but the area in question is not the whole of Helmand Province.
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